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Abstract
I consider the model of a differentiated duopoly with process R&D when goods are either
substitute, complements or independent. I propose a non-cooperative two-stage game with two
firms producing differentiated goods. In the first stage, firms decide their technologies and in
the second stage, they compete in quantities or prices. I evaluate the social welfare within a
framework of Cournot and Bertrand competition models with or without investment in research
and development. I prove that the Cournot price can be lower than Bertrand price when the
R&D technology is relatively inefficient; thus, Cournot market structure can generate larger
consumer’s surplus and welfare.
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21 Introduction
The comparison of Cournot and Bertrand results in a static oligopoly setting have extensively been
studied in the literature. This paper focuses on welfare under Cournot and Bertrand competition
in differentiated oligopolies. From the literature, it is known that Bertrand competition yields
lower prices and profits and higher consumer surplus and welfare than Cournot competition (e.g;
[2],[8],[9],[10] and [14]). Accordingly, exploiting cost asymmetries including some other factors like
research and development (R & D) or endogenous privatization; some researchers like [1], [4], [5] and
[6] have constructed models where at least one of the latter conclusions fails to hold. One important
scope of the regulator in the economy is to get a better model that maximizes social welfare (sum of
total surplus net of total cost and other negatives externalities). Welfare comparison within Cournot
and Bertrand models can solve a social planner’s problem who wish to choose a better model in
market competition to improve the well-being of individuals in a society.
In this paper, I consider a non-cooperative, two-stage game with two firms producing differentiated
goods. In the first stage, firms independently decide their R&D (no spillovers effects) investment
that determines production technology and, in the second stage, they compete in quantities or
prices. The linear demands are derived from the utility maximizing problem of the representative
consumer. This paper generalizes the work of [6] in the sense that R&D technology function in their
paper is a specific case of this model. The main works of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1. Firstly, I compare the welfare under both models when firms are not investing in research
and development and my results are consistent with the literature (e.g, [10]). As my first
contribution, I formally show that Cournot and Bertrand competition models equilibria
coincide if and only if the products are independent. Then, I compare the welfare when
products are either independent, substitutes or complements.
2. Secondly, taking into account the investment in research and development makes the welfare
comparison under both models more interesting. After presenting the equilibrium outcomes of
each model, I discuss the well-being of consumers under the two possibilities offered to the
firms, investing or not in R&D. At the end, a discussion is given to evaluate the effects of R&D
size on different equilibrium outcomes. These comparative statics lead to a condition on which
social welfare is better under Cournot model relative to Bertrand model. All the results found
in this framework can be classified among situations where the pioneering findings of [10] do
not necessarily hold. As my second contribution, I prove that Cournot price can be lower than
3Bertrand price when R & D technology is relatively inefficient; thus Cournot market structure
can generate larger consumer’s surplus and welfare.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review of
comparing welfare through Cournot and Bertrand models using R&D process. Section 3.1 and 3.2
describe the equilibriums along with its implications on the welfare within a framework of Cournot
and Bertrand models. Section 4 examines the comparative statics. Section 5 concludes. The main
proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 Literature review
In a competitive market, firms often compete against each other by investing in research and
development in order to improve product quality (in the case of product R&D) and/or to reduce
production cost (in case of process R&D). The important difference between process and product
R&D as explained by [13] is that the product R&D directly affects gross consumer surplus. This
is because product R&D raises product quality, and quality enters directly into each consumer’s
utility function. Process R&D affects gross consumer surplus only indirectly through a reduction in
marginal cost and a consequent increase in output.
The traditional results (e.g; [2],[8],[9],[10], and [14]) mentioned above about the efficient equilib-
rium outcomes under Bertrand model relative to Cournot model are generally obtained under the
assumption that firms face the same demand and cost structures. In a dynamic environment, if the
R&D investments differ across the Bertrand and Cournot models, the post-innovation demand and
cost structures will also differ, even though they were identical before the investment. The question
which follows is whether the traditional results are affected in any way. Given the above difference
between process and product R&D, it is unclear whether the results from models with process R&D
carry over to the case of product R&D.
Qiu([9]) focused on cost-reducing R&D with spillover effects and reevaluated the relative efficiency
of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. He considered a non-cooperative, two stage game with two firms
producing differentiated goods. In the first stage, which is called R&D stage, each firm independently
sets out cost-reducing R&D. In the second stage called market stage, both firms produce and
compete in prices or quantities. He found that “Cournot competition induces more R&D effort than
Bertrand competition. The price is low and output is larger in Bertrand than in Cournot model.
The traditional efficiency result holds if either R&D productivity is low, or spillovers are weak, or
4products are very different. However, if R&D productivity is high, spillovers are strong, and goods
are close substitutes, then Bertrand equilibrium is less efficient than the Cournot equilibrium ”. The
latter challenged the traditional efficiency result.
Symeonidis [13] studied a variant of the standard linear demand model. He focused on product
R&D and used the quality-augmented linear structure proposed by [11], [12] and introduced a
cost structure that allows for R&D spillovers. He found almost the same results as [9]: “Indeed,
R&D expenditure, prices and firm’s net profits are always higher under Cournot competition than
under Bertrand competition. Output, consumer surplus and total welfare are higher under price
competition than under quantity competition if either R&D spillovers are weak or products are
sufficiently differentiated. Furthermore, if R&D spillovers are strong and products are not too
differentiated, then output, consumer surplus and total welfare are lower in the Bertrand case than
in the Cournot case ”.
Motta [7] analyzed two versions of a vertical product differentiation model, one with fixed and
the other with variable costs of quality. The case of fixed cost of quality improvement may be
thought of as a situation where firms should engage in R&D and advertising activities to improve
quality. He found that economy is better off when firms compete on prices (with fixed costs of
quality, not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition). Compare
to the model of Symeonidis ([13]), the study of Motta ([7]) did not allow for R&D spillovers.
Delbono and Denicolo ([3]) compared the equilibrium R&D investment under price and quantity
competition in a symmetric and homogenous oligopoly. They found that the welfare comparison is
generally ambiguous in the context of a homogenous product duopoly with process R&D in the
form of patent race. They have shown that: “although the R&D investment is greater under price
competition (in fact, it is even higher than the social optimal level), social welfare net of R&D cost,
may be greater under Cournot competition ”.
This paper focuses on differentiated duopoly with process R&D with no spillovers when goods
are either substitutes, complements or independent. The R&D function considered in this setting
is the generalized form of the one used by [6] in a non-cooperative two-stage game with two firms
producing differentiated goods. In the first stage, firms decide their technologies and in the second
stage, they compete in quantities or prices. I am comparing the social welfare (sum of net consumer
surplus and total producer surplus) within a framework of Cournot and Bertrand competition
models with or without investment in R&D. The results are consistent with those cited above
(traditional results) and with those found by [6] for the specific case of R&D. At the equilibrium,
5Cournot firms invest a larger amount on R&D than the Bertrand firms. Contrary to the traditional
results, Bertrand price can be higher than Cournot price. It is proven that this phenomenon happens
in the case where the R&D technology is relatively inefficient; thus Cournot market structure can
generate larger consumer’s surplus and welfare.
3 The model
I consider a non-cooperative, two-stage game with two firms producing differentiated goods. In the
first-stage, firms independently decide their R&D investment that determines production technology.
In the second stage, firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide their quantity or prices
depending on whether there is Cournot competition or Bertrand competition. I am using backward
induction to solve the game, that is, first solve the second stage problem and then the first stage,
taking the behavior of firms at the second stage. Assuming that the R&D technology is given by :
R(ci) = r
c−ei
e
(1)
Where e ≥ 1, r is a positive parameter, ci the firms i’s marginal cost of production. It shows
that the higher the value of r, the higher is the R&D cost, the lower the efficiency.
Following [10], I assume that the representative consumer’s preferences are described by the utility
function:
U(q1, q2) = a(q1 + q2)− b(q21 + 2θq1q2 + q22)/2 +m, (2)
with qi is the quantity of firm’s production, a > 0, b ∈ [0, 1], m is the numeraire good (composite
good) and θ ∈ [0, 1[ is a positive parameter. To derive the demand function, we need to solve the
following utility maximization problem:
max
q1,q2
{
U(q1, q2) = a(q1 + q2)− b(q21 + 2θq1q2 + q22)/2 +m
}
s.t I = p1q1 + p2q2 +m
(3)
where I is the consumer’s income. Rearranging the constraint of maximizing problem (3) by writing
m = I−p1q1−p2q2 and substituting into utility function gives the following equivalent maximization
problem:
max
q1,q2
{
U(q1, q2) = a(q1 + q2)− b(q21 + 2θq1q2 + q22)/2 + I − p1q1 − p2q2
}
. (4)
The first order condition for maximization problem is given by:
∂U(qi, qj)
∂qi
= a− b(qi + θqj)− pi = 0; i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j. (5)
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Solving (5) for pi gives :
pi = a− b(qi + θqj), i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j. (6)
Solving (6) for qi yields :
qi =
a
b(1 + θ)
− 1
b(1− θ2)pi +
θ
b(1− θ2)pj ; i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j. (7)
More generally, the demand function for good i derived from this type of utility function can be
written in the form:
qi = α− βpi + γpj i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j. (8)
I assume that β > γ and α > (β − γ)c. In this specific case, I have :
α =
a
b(1 + θ)
, β =
1
b(1− θ2) , γ =
θ
b(1− θ2) . (9)
These notations will be useful later. In what follows, I calculate the optimal output and prices
under Cournot competition model and Bertrand model with or without investment in R&D. In each
competition model, I derive the optimal social welfare and make some comparisons.
3.1 Cournot and Bertrand competition without investment in R&D
3.1.1 Cournot model without investment in R & D
In this set up, R(ci) = 0, so that there is a one short game where firms maximize simultaneously
their profits, each firm taking the quantity of other firm as given. From the fact that the demand
function is given by equation (6), the inverse demand function for each firm is given as follows:
pi =
α
β − γ −
γ
β2 − γ2 qj −
β
β2 − γ2 qi, i 6= j. (10)
For simplification, I will denote
ω =
α
β − γ , φ =
γ
β2 − γ2 , λ =
β
β2 − γ2 . (11)
The values of ω, λ, φ are positive and the inverse demand function can be rewritten as follows:
pi = ω − φqj − λqi, i 6= j. (12)
I assume that firms have the same marginal cost i.e ci = cj = c and c > a, so the following lemma
provides the Cournot equilibrium price, quantity and profit for each firm.
Lemma 3.1. The Cournot equilibrium (qc, pc, pic) is given by qc = a−cb(2+θ) , p
c = a+c(1+θ)2+θ and
pic = 1b [
a−c
2+θ ]
2.
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From Lemma 3.1, the equilibrium price is higher than the marginal cost (pc − c = a−c2+θ > 0) and
each firm makes positive profit. The equilibrium consumer surplus CS = U(q1, q2)− p1q1 − p2q2,
total producer profit (Π = pi1 + pi2), and welfare (W = total surplus) in Cournot competition are
given as follows :
CSc =
(1 + θ)
b
(
a− c
2 + θ
)2 +m ; Πc =
2
b
(
a− c
2 + θ
)2 ; W c = CSc + Πc =
(3 + θ)
b
(
a− c
2 + θ
)2 +m (13)
3.1.2 Bertrand model without investment in R&D
In this framework, I still have R(c) = 0, and firms solve simultaneously their usual profit-maximization
problem, in order to obtain their optimal prices, each firm taking the price of other firm as given.
The fact that I assumed the same constant marginal cost implies that, at equilibrium, firms produce
the same quantity, sell at the same price and earn the same positive profit. The following lemma
generalizes the Bertrand equilibriums quantity, price and profit.
Lemma 3.2. The Bertrand equilibrium (qB, pB, piB) is given by :
pB = a(1−θ)+c2−θ , q
B = a−cb(1+θ)(2−θ) and pi
B = 1−θb(1+θ) [
a−c
2−θ ]
2.
According to lemma 3.2, pB − c = (1−θ)(a−c)2−θ , a > c and θ < 1, it follows that each firm sells
products at the price above marginal cost and earns a positive economic profit. The equilibrium
consumer surplus CSB, the total producer profit ΠB, and welfare (WB = total surplus) in Bertrand
competition are given by:
CSB =
1
b(1 + θ)
(
a− c
2− θ )
2+m ; ΠB =
2(1− θ)
b(1 + θ)
(
a− c
2− θ )
2 ; WB = CSB+ΠB =
(3− 2θ)
b(1 + θ)
(
a− c
2− θ )
2+m
(14)
The results (Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2) found above clearly show that the equilibrium at the market
is different in both Cournot and Bertrand models. In fact, in Cournot competition model, firms
find the optimal quantities to maximize their profits rather than solving for the optimal prices
as in the Bertrand competition model. Hence, social welfare is different according to each market
equilibrium. What happens to these different levels of social welfare if both equilibrium outcomes
coincide? We might be interested in looking under which model, society is better off, Cournot or
Bertrand competition? In what follows, I provide one condition for which the equilibrium outcomes
coincide and I study the consequences of this condition on social welfare.
Theorem 3.1. The Cournot equilibrium and the Bertrand equilibrium coincide if and only if the
goods are independent, i.e the parameter θ in the linear demand function (6) is zero.
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The proof of this theorem is provided in the appendix. The result of Theorem 3.1 is consistent
with the traditional results found by [10] that at the equilibrium market, prices are lower and
outputs are higher under Bertrand competition compared to Cournot competition for substitutes
or complements goods. Moreover, profits are larger, equal or smaller in Cournot than in Bertrand
competition, depending on whether the goods are substitutes, independent, or complements. Here,
with goods that are substitutes, I find that the highest profit is achieved at the Cournot equilibrium.
Notice that if the parameter θ = 0, I can rewrite the demand function as follows: qi =
1
b (a− pi)
and qj =
1
b (a− pj). The demand function in this case are independent. We have two monopolies
firms in the market which produce the same quantity qM = a−c2b of different products, sell them at
the same monopoly price pM = a−c2 and earn the same profit pi
M = 1b
(a−c)2
4 . At this equilibrium,
the consumer surplus is SCM = 1b (
a−c
2 )
2 +m, the total producer surplus ΠM = 2b (
a−c
2 )
2 and the
social welfare WM = 3b (
a−c
2 )
2 +m.
Firms earn higher profit under monopoly competition than Bertrand or Cournot competition.
Less competition in the market leads to higher prices, lower production and eventually to lower
consumer surplus. Society is better off under Bertrand competition or Cournot competition compared
to monopoly market. It can be proved that CSM < CSB, CSM < CSc, ΠM > ΠB, ΠM > Πc,
WM < WB and WM < W c. The following proposition generalizes the welfare comparison between
Cournot and Bertrand models without investment in research and development.
Proposition 3.1.
CSB − CSc = (a− c)
2
b
θ2[2 + θ + (1 + θ)(2− θ)]
(1 + θ)(4− θ2)2 , (15)
Πc −ΠB = 4(a− c)
2
b
θ3
(1 + θ)(4− θ2)2 , (16)
and
WB −W c = − (a− c)
2
b(1 + θ)(4− θ2)2 θ
2(θ2 + 2θ − 4). (17)
Since θ ∈ [0, 1[ and a > c, using the equations (15), (16) and (17), I have CSB ≥ CSc, Πc ≥ ΠB
and WB ≥W c. Lower prices and higher quantities are always better in welfare terms. Consumer
surplus is decreasing and convex as a function of prices. Therefore, in term of consumer surplus,
the Bertrand equilibrium dominates the Cournot equilibrium as proved in equation (15). Given
that the goods are substitutes, low prices mean lower profit which implies that Cournot’s total
producer surplus is higher than Bertrand’s total producer surplus as shown by equation (16). The
same results were found by [10], that consumer surplus and total surplus U(q1, q2) are larger in
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Bertrand equilibrium than in Cournot competition except when the goods are independent. In this
latter case, consumer surplus and total surplus are equal under both competition models. Singh and
Vives ([10]) have shown that the converse of this assertion is true if goods are complements, because
in order to increase profits, firms have to lower prices from the Cournot levels to gain the market
share. From equation (17), the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than Cournot equilibrium.
3.2 Cournot and Bertrand competition with investment in R&D
3.2.1 Cournot model with investment in R&D
In what follows, I use backward induction to solve the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage
game described at the beginning of section 3. Let picii denote firm i’s market profit at stage 2, then:
picii = (pi − ci)qi − r c
−e
i
e , where “ci ” means Cournot with investment in R&D. At this stage, firms
choose simultaneously their optimal level of production taking the marginal cost as given. So, firm i
solves the following maximization problem:
max
qi
{
picii (qi, qj) = (pi − ci)qi − r c
−e
i
e
}
s.t pi = a− bqi − bθqj
(18)
In the first stage, firms choose simultaneously their optimal level of R&D cost considering the
optimal level of production at the second stage. The following proposition describes the equilibrium
conditions of the game.
Proposition 3.2. The conditions describing the two-stage Cournot equilibrium are summarized in
the following equations:
4
4− θ2 q
ci = rĉ−e−1 (19)
qci =
a− ĉ
b(2 + θ)
(20)
pci =
a+ ĉ(1 + θ)
2 + θ
(21)
pici =
1
b
[
a− ĉ
2 + θ
]2 − r ĉ
−e
e
, e ≥ 1 (22)
The proof of this proposition is provided in appendix. From this proposition, the equilibrium
in symmetric Cournot competition with investment in R&D are as follows: consumer surplus
CSci = (1+θ)b (
a−ĉ
2+θ )
2 + m, the total producer profit Πci = 2b (
a−ĉ
2+θ )
2 − 2r ĉ−ee , and welfare W ci =
(3+θ)
b (
a−ĉ
2+θ )
2 +m− 2r ĉ−ee , where ĉ is the optimal level of R&D cost chosen by firms at the first stage.
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Using equation (14) in the Cournot model in section 2, the welfare comparison under symmetric
Cournot model with and without investment in R&D are given by:
CSci − CSc = 1+θ
b(2+θ)2
(c− ĉ)(2a− c− ĉ)
Πci −Πc = 2
b(2+θ)2
(c− ĉ)(2a− c− ĉ)− 2r ĉ−ee
W ci −W c = 3+θ
b(2+θ)2
(c− ĉ)(2a− c− ĉ)− 2r ĉ−ee
(23)
Remark 3.1. It follows that CSci R CSc if and only if c R ĉ; Πci < Πc and W ci < W c if ĉ ≥ c.
If ĉ < c, the sign of Πci −Πc and W ci −W c are ambiguous. A clear comparison of welfare can be
provide when full information about the size of R and D cost R(ĉ) can be estimated. I may expect to
have higher level of welfare in case where ĉ < c because by investing more in R&D, firms lower their
marginal cost, produce more, and this can ultimately improves social welfare.
3.2.2 Bertrand competition with investment in R&D
In this section, the demand curve is given by equation (7) or (8). I still use backward induction
to solve the R&D problem maximization as in the previous section. At stage 2, firms choose
simultaneously prices to maximize profits taken the R&D marginal cost as given. Using equation
(6), the firm i’s profit maximization problem at stage 2 is set up as follows:
max
pi
{
piBii (pi, pj , ci, cj) = (pi − ci)qi = (pi − ci)(α− βpi + γpj)− r
c−ei
e
}
, (24)
where “Bi” means Bertrand competition with investment in R&D.
In the first stage, firms choose simultaneously their optimal level of R&D cost, considering the
optimal level of production at the second stage. I have the following result:
Proposition 3.3. The conditions describing this two-stage Bertrand equilibrium are characterized
in the following equations:
− θ
2
b(1− θ2)(4− θ2)(p
Bi − c˜) + a− p
Bi
b(1 + θ)
= rc˜−e−1 (25)
pBi =
a(1− θ) + c˜
2− θ (26)
qBi =
a− c˜
b(1 + θ)(2− θ) (27)
piBi =
1− θ
b(1 + θ)
[
a− c˜
2− θ ]
2 − r c˜
−e
e
, e ≥ 1 (28)
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The proof of this proposition is provided in the appendix. The equilibrium in symmetric Bertrand
competition with investment in R&D are as follows: consumer surplus CSBi = 1b(1+θ)(
a−c˜
2−θ )
2 +m,
total producer profit ΠBi = 2(1−θ)b(1+θ) (
a−c˜
2−θ )
2 − 2r c˜−ee , and welfare WBi = 3−2θb(1+θ)(a−c˜2−θ )2 + m − 2r c˜
−e
e ,
where c˜ is the optimal level of R&D cost chosen by firms at the first stage.
It is important to mention that the welfare comparison that I did in the previous section can be
done here as well. The better off situation depends on the gap (c− c˜) between the different marginal
cost and /or the size of R and D investment.
Assuming that firms compete under Cournot competition, and firm i invests enough in the
R&D in the first stage. It turns out that this investment in R&D reduces its marginal cost at
the second stage and increases its output. Given that the quantities are strategic substitutes, the
quantity produced by firm j is reduced, which increases firm i’s profit. Given that prices are strategic
complements, I have the reverse result under Bertrand competition model.
Proposition 3.4. In equilibrium, Cournot firms have larger incentive to invest in R and D, i.e
ĉ < c˜.
The proof of this result is given in the appendix. This proposition is consistent with the ones
shown by Kabiraj and Roy ([6]) for a specific case R&D technology (when e = 1).
In the next section, I study the effect of the size of R&D technology on marginal costs, prices and
social welfare at equilibrium.
4 Comparative statics
The following comparative static result shows that, as the investment in research and development
becomes more and more inefficient, marginal cost under each Cournot or Bertrand model increases,
but it increases more under Bertrand competition. The following lemma shows the variation of
optimal technology c˜ and ĉ with the size r of R&D. We recall that these technologies depend on the
parameter r. Higher r implies that the R&D investment becomes more inefficient. The following
propositions also generalize the results found by [6]. Proposition 4.1 evaluates the effect of R&D
technology size on the equilibrium marginal costs of both models and Proposition 4.2 provides the
effect of investment in R&D technology on equilibrium prices.
Proposition 4.1. dĉdr > 0,
dc˜
dr > 0 and
dĉ
dr <
dc˜
dr .
Proposition 4.2. dp
ci
dr > 0,
dpBi
dr > 0 and
dpBi
dr ≥ dp
ci
dr
12
The proofs of these propositions are provided in the appendix. The latter result (Proposition
4.2) describes the shape of curves pci(r) and pBi(r). It shows that both curves are upward sloping
with pBi(r) having a greater slope than pci(r).
From Proposition 4.2, I can derive the following corollary about the comparison of prices under
Cournot and Bertrand model with investment in R&D.
Corollary 4.1. There exists r∗ such that, pBi > pci if and only if r > r∗.
This corollary tells us that, if the R&D technology is inefficient (higher r), then Cournot price
will be lower than Bertrand price and vice versa. Large r increases marginal cost (see proposition
4.1), but it increases more under Bertrand competition, leading to higher prices relative to Cournot
prices. This result is consistent with the results found by Qiu([9]) and Kabiraj and Roy ([6]). They
have proved that when R&D technology is more efficient (lower r), the Cournot prices are greater
than Bertrand prices at equilibrium. When r goes up, firms invest more in R&D under the Cournot
model, then the marginal cost increases at a lower rate than under Bertrand model which lead to
lower prices. This latter result is still consistent in this general setting.
One interesting implication of these results is that, inefficient R&D technology will generate
larger consumer’s surplus and social welfare under the Cournot competition model. But, it is also
important to mention that consumers’ surpluses under both models decrease with the size of R&D
technology. We can show that dCS
ci
dr =
−2(1+θ)
b(2+θ)2
dĉ
dr (a − ĉ) and dCS
Bi
dr =
−2
b(1+θ)(2−θ)2
dc˜
dr (a − c˜). The
usefulness of these latter expressions are still being studied.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to compare Cournot and Bertrand models on efficiency of results in
term of social welfare. The important result that challenged the traditional result on efficiency of
Bertrand equilibrium outcome is that at the equilibrium, not only the Cournot firms invest a larger
amount on R&D than the Bertrand firms, but Bertrand price can be higher than Cournot price. I
prove that this occurs when the R&D technology is relatively inefficient; thus a Cournot market
structure can generate larger consumer’s surplus and total welfare. In this paper, all payoff functions
and costs are parametric and there are only two firms. One eminent project is to generalize this
research by allowing a competition between a large number of firms, and by using non-parametric
functions. I expect that this general case can provide something like a necessary and/or sufficient
condition that could provide more practical guidance. Moreover, I did not report the effects of R&D
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size on producer surplus or total welfare because they are still being studied. Some future research
will be based on evaluating these effects on one side, and comparing Cournot and Bertrand models
on other separate issues from R&D.
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6 Appendix
Proof of lemma 3.1:
The marginal cost of each firm is c, then firm i’s profit - maximization problem is set up as:
max
qi
{pii(qi, qj) = (pi − c)qi}
s.t pi = ω − φqj − λqi
(A1).
The first order condition for maximization problem is given by:
∂pii
∂qi
= ω − φqj − 2λqi − c = 0 (A2),
and the second derivative of profit is given by:
∂2pii
∂q2i
= −2λ.
In order to maximize the profit, the second derivative should be negative. Since, the sign of λ is
positive, I conclude that the second condition is satisfied. Solving equation (A2) for qi gives :
qi =
ω − φqj − c
2λ
,
and using the fact that by symmetry qci = q
c
j = q
c, I obtain
2λqc + φqc = ω − c,
and solving for qc gives :
qc =
ω − c
2λ+ φ
(A3).
Now, I obtain the equilibrium price for each firm by substituting the equilibrium quantity (A3)
in the inverse demand function in equation (12). Furthermore, by symmetry pci = p
c
j = p
c, then
pc = ω − (φ+ λ)qc. It follows that:
pc = ω − (φ+ λ) (ω − c)
2λ+ φ)
=
(2λ+ φ)ω − (φ+ λ)(ω − c)
2λ+ φ
=
(2λ+ φ)ω − (φ+ λ)ω + c(φ+ λ)
2λ+ φ
=
ω(2λ+ φ− φ− λ) + c(φ+ λ)
2λ+ φ
=
λω + cφ+ cλ
2λ+ φ
pc =
λω + c(φ+ λ)
2λ+ φ
(A4).
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Therefore,
pc − c = λω + c(φ+ λ)
2λ+ φ
− c
=
λω + (φ+ λ− 2λ− φ)c
2λ+ φ
=
λ(ω − c)
2λ+ φ
.
As above, firms have the same profit pic = (pc − c)qc. Substituting for the value of qc and pc in
the profit function gives :
pic =
λ(ω − c)
2λ+ φ
× ω − c
2λ+ φ
= λ(
ω − c
2λ+ φ
)2.
Since I denoted ω = αβ−γ , φ =
γ
β2−γ2 , λ =
β
β2−γ2 in (11), I want to simplify the expressions of q
c, pc
and pic in terms of α, β and γ.
1. I have qc = ω−c2λ+φ from (18).
• ω − c = αβ−γ − c = α−c(β−γ)β−γ ;
• 2λ+ φ = 2β
β2−γ2 +
γ
β2−γ2 =
2β+γ
β2−γ2 =
2β+γ
(β−γ)(β+γ) ;
It follows that qc = ω−c2λ+φ =
α−c[β−γ]
(β−γ) × (β−γ)(β+γ)2β+γ , by simplifying the factor (β − γ) , I get
qc = [α−c(β−γ)](β+γ)2β+γ (A5).
2. I have pc = λω+c(φ+λ)2λ+φ from (A4).
• φ+ λ = β+γ(β+γ)(β−γ) = 1β−γ ;
• λω = αβ
(β−γ)(β2−γ2) , so λω + c(φ+ λ) =
αβ
(β−γ)(β2−γ2) +
c
β−γ =
αβ+c(β2−γ2)
(β−γ)(β2−γ2) ;
Then, pc = λω+c(φ+λ)2λ+φ =
αβ+c[β2−γ2]
(β−γ)(β2−γ2) × (β
2−γ2)
2β+γ , and by simplifying the factor (β
2 − γ2) , I
obtain pc = αβ+c[β
2−γ2]
(β−γ)(2β+γ) (A6).
3. I have pic = λ( ω−c2λ+φ)
2 from (19).
• ω−c2λ+φ = α−c(β−γ)β−γ × (β−γ)(β+γ)2β+γ = [α−c(β−γ)](β+γ)2β+γ ;
• λ( ω−c2λ+φ)2 = β(β−γ)(β+γ) × (β + γ)(β + γ)[α−c(β−γ)2β+γ ]2.
By simplifying the factor (β+γ) in the latter expression, I obtain pic = β(β+γ)β−γ [
α−c(β−γ)
2β+γ ]
2 (A7).
From equation (9), substituting the expressions of parameters α, β and γ in terms of parameters
a, b, θ in the expressions (A5), (A6) and (A7), I obtain β + γ = 1b(1−θ) ; 2β + γ =
2+θ
b(1−θ2) and
α− (β − γ)c = a−cb(1+θ) . Therefore, I deduce that the Cournot equilibrium quantity is qc = a−cb(2+θ) , the
Cournot equilibrium pc = a+c(1+θ)2+θ and the positive Cournot equilibrium profit pi
c = 1b [
a−c
2+θ ]
2.
Proof of lemma 3.2:
The firm i’s profit-maximization problem is:
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max
pi
{pii(pi, pj) = (pi − c)qi = (pi − c)(α− βpi + γpj)} (A8).
The first order condition of problem (A8) is given by:
∂pi
∂pi
= α− βpi + γpj − β(pi − c) = 0 (A9),
and the second order condition is:
∂2pi
∂p2i
= −2β < 0 since β > 0.
Solving for equation (A9) with respect to pi gives :
2βpi = α+ γpj + βc (A10).
By symmetry, the equilibrium price for each firm is such that pBi = p
B
j = p
B. Then, using these
latter equalities and substituting in the equilibrium price’s equation lead to 2βpB = α+ γpB + βc,
rearranging terms and solving the latter equation for price pB gives pB = α+βc2β−γ (A11).
Now, I find the quantity of each firm at the equilibrium. By symmetry, qBi = q
B
j = q
B, then
substituting the equilibrium price in demand function (8) yields:
qB = α− (β − γ)pB
= α− (β − γ)α+ βc
2β − γ
= α− (β − γ)(α+ βc)
2β − γ
=
α(2β − γ)− (β − γ)(α+ βc)
2β − γ
=
α(2β − γ)− α(β − γ)− βc(β − γ)
2β − γ
=
α(2β − γ − β + γ)− βc(β − γ)
2β − γ
=
αβ − βc(β − γ)
2β − γ
qB =
β[α− (β − γ)c]
2β − γ (A12).
Symmetry assumption implies that piBi = pi
B
j = pi
B. Given that piB = (pB − c)qB (A13), I use
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the above expressions of pB and qB to obtain the complete form of piB. Using equation (A11), I get:
pB − c = α+ βc
2β − γ − c
=
α+ βc− 2βc+ γc
2β − γ
=
α− βc+ γc
2β − γ
pB − c = α− (β − γ)c
2β − γ (A14).
From equation (A14), since α > (β − γ), I conclude that pc > c. Substituting equations (A12)
and (A14) in equations (A13) above gives piB = [α−(β−γ)c2β−γ ] × [β[α−(β−γ)c]2β−γ ], and then piB =
β[α−(β−γ)c2β−γ ]
2 (A15).
Since α = ab(1+θ) , β =
1
b(1−θ2) , γ =
θ
b(1−θ2) , it follows that :
α+ βc =
a(1− θ) + c
b(1− θ2) , 2β − γ =
2− θ
b(1− θ2) and α− (β − γ)c =
a− c
b(1 + θ)
.
Therefore, I conclude that pB = a(1−θ)+c2−θ , q
B = a−cb(1+θ)(2−θ) and pi
B = 1−θb(1+θ) [
a−c
2−θ ]
2.
Proof of theorem 3.1:
The Cournot equilibrium (qc, pc, pic) is given by :
pc =
a+ c(1 + θ)
2 + θ
, qc =
a− c
b(2 + θ)
, pic =
(a− c)2
b(2 + θ)2
.
and the Bertrand equilibrium (qB, pB, piB) is given by :
pB =
a(1− θ) + c
2− θ , q
B =
b(1 + θ)
(2− θ) , pi
B =
1− θ
b(1 + θ)
(a− c)2
(2− θ)2 .
I also have:
pc − pB = a− c
4− θ2 θ
2
qB − qc = a− c
b(1 + θ)(4− θ2)θ
2
and
pic − piB = 2(a− c)
2
b(1 + θ)(4− θ2)2 θ
3
From these equations, I show that pc = pB, qc = qB and pic = piB if and only if the parameter θ is
equal zero. Moreover, given that a > c, if θ > 0, I have pc > pB, qB > qc and pic > piB.
Proof of proposition 3.2:
Let picii denote firm i’s market profit at stage 2, then: pi
ci
i = (pi − ci)qi − r c
−e
i
e . At this stage, firms
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choose simultaneously their optimal level of production taking the marginal cost as given. So, firm i
solves the following maximization problem:
max
qi
{
picii (qi, qj) = (pi − ci)qi − r c
−e
i
e
}
s.t pi = a− bqi − bθqj
The first order condition for maximization problem is given by:
∂picii
∂qi
= a− bθqj − 2bqi − ci = 0; i 6= j; i, j = 1, 2 (A16);
and the second derivative of profit is given by:
∂2picii
∂q2i
= −2b < 0.
From equation (A16), I have the following system:
 2bqi + bθqj = a− cibθqi + 2bqj = a− cj .
Solving this system for qi and qj gives :
qcii =
a
b(2 + θ)
+
2ci − θcj
b(θ2 − 4) (A17)
qcij =
a
b(2 + θ)
+
2cj − θci
b(θ2 − 4) (A18)
The firm i’s profit at stage 1 is given by: picii (q
ci
i , q
ci
j , ci, cj) = (p
ci
i − ci)qcii − r c
−e
i
e which can be
rewritten as picii (q
ci
i , q
ci
j , ci, cj) = (a− bqcii − bθqcij − ci)qcii − r c
−e
i
e .
At this stage, firms choose simultaneously their optimal level of R&D cost considering the optimal
level of production at the next stage. Then firm i’s profit maximization problem is given by:
max
ci
{
picii (q
ci
i , q
ci
j , ci, cj) = (a− bqcii − bθqcij − ci)qcii − r c
−e
i
e
}
s.t (A17) and (A18)
The first order condition for maximization problem is given by:
dpicii
dci
=
∂picii
∂qcii
× ∂q
ci
i
∂ci
+
∂picii
∂qcij
× ∂q
ci
j
∂ci
+
∂picii
∂ci
=
4
θ2 − 4q
ci
i + rc
−e−1
i = 0,
and the second derivative of profit is given by:
d2picii
∂c2i
=
8
b(θ2 − 4)2 − (e+ 1)rc
−e−2
i .
I assume that the second derivative is satisfied. Let also assume the symmetric equilibrium at first
stage, then ccii = c
ci
j = ĉ < a, then q
ci
i = q
ci = qcij and p
ci
i = p
ci = pcij . Using the same algebras as in
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the section 2, I obtain the required conditions.
Proof of proposition 3.3:
Firm i’s profit maximization problem at stage 2 is set up as:
max
pi
{
piBii (pi, pj , ci, cj) = (pi − ci)qi = (pi − ci)(α− βpi + γpj)− r
c−ei
e
}
The first order condition of problem (31) is given by:
∂pi
∂pi
= α− 2βpi + γpj + βci = 0, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, 2} (A19),
and the second order condition is:
∂2pi
∂p2i
= −2β < 0 (since β > 0).
From equation (A19), I retrieve the following system:
 2βpi − γpj = α+ βci−γpi + 2βpj = α+ βcj .
Solving this system for pi and pj give s:
pBii =
α
2β − γ +
2β2ci + βγcj
4β2 − γ2 (A20)
pBij =
α
2β − γ +
2β2cj + βγci
4β2 − γ2 (A21)
The firm i’s profit at stage 1 is given by:
piBii (p
Bi
i , p
Bi
j , ci, cj) = (p
Bi
i − ci)qcii − r
c−ei
e
,
or
piBii (p
Bi
i , p
Bi
j , ci, cj) = (p
Bi
i − ci)(α− βpBii + γpBij )− r
c−ei
e
.
At this stage, firms choose simultaneously their optimal level of R&D cost considering the optimal
level of price at the next stage. Thus, firm i solves the following profit maximization problem:
max
ci
{
picii (q
ci
i , q
ci
j , ci, cj) = (p
Bi
i − ci)(α− βpBii + γpBij )− r c
−e
i
e
}
s.t (A20) and (A21)
The first order condition for maximization problem is given by:
dpiBii
dci
=
∂piBii
∂pBii
× ∂p
Bi
i
∂ci
+
∂piBii
∂pBij
× ∂p
Bi
j
∂ci
+
∂picii
∂ci
=
γ2β
4β2 − γ2 (p
Bi
i −ci)− (α−βpBii +γpBij )+rc−e−1i = 0,
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and the second derivative of profit is given by:
d2piBii
dc2i
= 2β[
2β2 − γ2
4β2 − γ2 ]
2 − (e+ 1)rc−e−2i .
I assume that the second derivative is satisfied. Let also assume the symmetric equilibrium at first
stage, then cBii = c
Bi
j = c˜ < a, then p
Bi
i = p
Bi = pBij and q
Bi
i = q
Bi = qBij . After doing some algebras
and substituting α, β and γ by their expressions in terms of a, b and θ, I obtain the equilibrium
conditions.
Proof of proposition 3.4:
By symmetry of equilibrium for any c satisfying (25) and after doing some algebras, I obtain:
dpiBi
dc
=
(2θ2 − 4)(a− c)
b(1 + θ)(2− θ)(4− θ2) + rc
−e−1
By first order condition, I have dpi
Bi
dc |c=c˜ = 0. Also, dpi
Bi
dc |c=ĉ = 2θ(a−ĉ)(θ
2+θ+2)
b(4−θ2)2(1+θ) which is positive.
By again using symmetry of equilibrium for any c satisfying equation (19), I have:
dpici
dc
=
−4(a− c)
b(4− θ2)(2 + θ) + rc
−e−1
By the first order condition, dpi
ci
dc |c=ĉ = 0 and dpi
ci
dc |c=c˜ = − 2θ
3(a−c˜)
b(4−θ2)2(1+θ) which is negative. It follows
that firm have more incentive to invest in R&D under Cournot equilibrium rather than Bertrand
equilibrium, and then ĉ < c˜.
Proof of proposition 4.1:
Case 1: dĉdr > 0.
From equations (19) and (20), I obtain the following equation:
4
b(2 + θ)(4− θ2)(a− ĉ)ĉ
e+1 = r (A22).
Differentiating equation (A22) with respect to r and solving for dĉdr gives :
dĉ
dr
=
b(2 + θ)(4− θ2)
4
× ĉ
−e
[(e+ 1)(a− ĉ)− ĉ] (A23).
Let denote C(θ) = b(2+θ)(4−θ
2)
4 . Given that C(θ) is positive, I just need to show that (e+1)(a− ĉ)− ĉ
is also positive. To prove that, I use the second order condition from proposition 3.2 (stage 1
maximization problem). From there, I have the second order condition:
∂2picii
∂c2i
= 4
θ2−4
∂qcii
∂ci
− (e +
1)r
c−e−1i
ci
< 0. Given that I assume symmetry equilibrium, ci = ĉ and q
ci
i = q
ci; from equation (20), I
have
∂qcii
∂ci
= ∂q
ci
∂ĉ =
−1
b(2+θ) . Substituting
∂qcii
∂ci
and r from equation (A22) in the second order condition,
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and simplify, I get ∂
2pici
∂ĉ2
= 4
b(4−θ2)(2+θ) [
ĉ−(e+1)(a−ĉ)
ĉ ]. Since
∂2pici
∂ĉ2
< 0, then ĉ < (e + 1)(a − ĉ) i.e
(e+ 1)(a− ĉ)− ĉ > 0 and dĉdr > 0.
Case 2: dc˜dr > 0.
Using equation (26) from Bertrand equilibrium, I have ∂p
Bi
∂r =
1
2−θ
dc˜
dr . Differentiating equation (25)
with respect to r and solving for dc˜dr yields:
dc˜
dr
=
c˜−e
θ2(1−θ)
b(1−θ2)(4−θ2)(2−θ) c˜− c˜b(1+θ)(2−θ) + (e+ 1)rc˜−e−1
=
c˜−e
B
.
Now, I show that B > 0. I use equations (25), (26), the second order condition derived from
proposition 3.3 (stage 1 maximization problem) and symmetric equilibrium. Using (26), I get
pBi − c˜ = (1−θ)(a−c˜)2−θ and a− pBi = a−c˜2−θ . Substituting these latter expressions into equation (25) lead
to the following expression:
rc˜−e−1 =
−θ2
b(1− θ2)(4− θ2)
(1− θ)(a− c˜)
2− θ +
a− c˜
b(2− θ)(1 + θ) (A23).
Substituting rc˜−e−1 from equation (A23) into expression B and doing some algebras gives:
B =
2(2− θ2)
b(1 + θ)(4− θ2)(2− θ) [(e+ 1)(a− c˜)− c˜].
The second order condition for proposition 3.3 can be rewritten as follows:
∂2piBii
∂c2i
= θ
2
b(1−θ2)(4−θ2) [
∂pBii
∂ci
− 1] + 1
b(1−θ2)
∂pBii
∂ci
− θ
b(1−θ2)
∂pBij
∂ci
− r(e + 1)c˜−e−2i < 0. By symmetric
equilibrium, I have pBii = p
Bi, c˜i = c˜ for i ∈ {1, 2} and ∂pBi∂c˜ = 12−θ . Using these latter information,
the second order condition can be rewritten as:
∂2piBi
∂c˜2
= − θ2(1−θ)c˜
b(1−θ2)(4−θ2)(2−θ) +
c˜
b(1+θ)(2−θ) − r(e + 1)c˜−e−1 < 0. Substituting equation (A23) into
this latter second order condition lead to [ θ
2(1−θ)
b(1−θ2)(4−θ2)(2−θ) − 1b(1+θ)(2−θ) ](e+ 1)(a− c˜)− c˜) < 0 i.e
− 2(2−θ2)
b(1+θ)(4−θ2)(2−θ) [(e+ 1)(a− c˜)− c˜] < 0 or −B < 0. It follows that B > 0, then dc˜dr > 0.
Note that B positive means (e+1)(a− c˜)− c˜ is also positive, given that 2(2−θ2)
b(1+θ)(4−θ2)(2−θ) > 0. Finally,
the expression dc˜dr can be rewritten as follows:
dc˜
dr
=
b(1 + θ)(4− θ2)(2− θ)
2(2− θ2) ×
c˜−e
[(e+ 1)(a− c˜)− c˜] .
Let denote B(θ) = b(1+θ)(4−θ
2)(2−θ)
2(2−θ2) .
Case 3: dc˜dr >
dĉ
dr .
From some expressions in cases 1 and 2, I write:
dc˜
dr
/
dĉ
dr
=
B(θ)
C(θ)
× ( ĉ
c˜
)e+1 × (e+ 1)[
a
ĉ − 1]
(e+ 1)[ac˜ − 1]
.
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I have B(θ)C(θ) =
2(1+θ)(2−θ)
(2+θ)(2−θ2) > 1 and
(e+1)[a
ĉ
−1]
(e+1)[a
c˜
−1] > 1 since c˜ > ĉ. Assuming that the ratio of marginal
cost is close to one which means that the term ( ĉc˜)
e+1 is not so low to reduce the product of terms on
the right side of the ratio of marginal effect of R&D size on marginal cost far to one, I conclude that
dc˜
dr/
dĉ
dr > 1 or
dc˜
dr >
dĉ
dr . Without this assumption, I may also have
dc˜
dr <
dĉ
dr in case where Bertrand
firms invest too much in R&D for instance, or in case where the ratio of marginal cost is too low.
Proof of proposition 4.2:
From equation (21), I have pci = a+ĉ(1+θ)2+θ) , so
dpci
dr =
1+θ
2+θ
dĉ
dr . By proposition 4.1,
dĉ
dr > 0, then
dpci
dr > 0.
From equation (26), pBi = a(1−θ)+c˜2−θ , so
dpBi
dr =
1
2−θ
dc˜
dr . Using again proposition 4.1,
dpBi
dr > 0 since
dc˜
dr > 0. I have
dpBi
dr − dp
ci
dr =
1
2−θ
dc˜
dr − 1+θ2+θ dĉdr . By doing some algebras, 12−θ − 1+θ2+θ = θ
2
4−θ2 which is
non negative. Since, I have shown that dĉdr >
dĉ
dr , hence
dpBi
dr − dp
ci
dr ≥ 0.
